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International large-scale assessments such as PISA are increasingly being used to benchmark 
the academic performance of young people across the world. Yet many of the technicalities 
underpinning these datasets are misunderstood by applied researchers, who sometimes fail to 
take their complex sample and test designs into account. The aim of this paper is to generate a 
better understanding amongst economists about how such databases are created, and what this 
implies for the empirical methodologies one should (or should not) apply. We explain how 
some of the modelling strategies preferred by economists seem to be at odds with the complex 
test design, and provide clear advice on the types of robustness tests that are therefore needed 
when analyzing these datasets. In doing so, we hope to generate a better understanding of 
international large-scale education databases, and promote better practice in their use. 
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1. Introduction  
International assessment programs have received much attention over the last two decades, 
with academics, journalists and public policymakers all eagerly awaiting every set of new 
results. Although the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is perhaps the 
most well-known, a number of other studies fall into this group including the Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), the Progress in International Reading 
Literacy Study (PIRLS) and the Programme for International Assessment of Adult 
Competencies (PIAAC). These data are also increasingly being used by social scientists to 
investigate the correlates and consequences of young people’s educational achievements. 
Given the widespread political and policy interest in these studies, such secondary analyses 
have the potential to generate hugely influential results. 
Many of the aforementioned international assessment programs also have ambitious objectives. 
PISA, for instance, attempts to benchmark 15-year-olds’ achievement in three or four academic 
disciplines (e.g. reading, mathematics, science and collaborative problem-solving) across more 
than 70 countries. This is despite PISA being a relatively short (two hour), low-stakes test. The 
way the survey organizers try to achieve this goal, through a complex sample and test design, 
is poorly understood by many applied researchers who often fail to treat the data as the survey 
organizers intended.  
It is this misunderstanding of these data – particularly amongst economists – which has 
motivated the need for this paper. We highlight this point in Appendix A (available in the 
online materials), illustrating how most studies using PISA published in five influential 
economics journals have failed to mention (or properly account for) at least one aspect of the 
sample or test design. Our aim is to provide a non-technical description of the major 
international large-scale assessment programs (e.g. PISA), to clearly articulate what their 
designs imply for secondary analyses of these data and to provide a case study investigating 
whether ignoring these features has a substantive impact upon one particularly interesting set 
of empirical results. 
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In order to achieve these goals, we replicate a recent study published in The Economic Journal 
by Lavy (2015).4 This serves as a particularly interesting example, as fairly standard 
econometric approaches – OLS and pupil fixed-effects – are applied to the PISA data, but with 
few adjustments made to account for the complex sample and test design. As noted above and 
illustrated in Appendix A, we do not believe this to be unusual. Indeed, others in the economics 
of education field have used similar methods (e.g. Rivkin and Schiman 2015, Hanushek, 
Piopiunik and Wiederhold 2014, and Cattaneo, Oggenfuss and Wolter 2017). Although the 
substantive conclusions these papers reach may or may not be undermined, we nevertheless 
argue that the special features of the PISA data mean that the common econometric 
identification strategies used in these papers should have been through a series of important 
additional robustness tests (which we shall describe in section 5 of this paper). In doing so, we 
hope to generate a better understanding of how international assessments such as PISA are 
designed and what this subsequently means for secondary analyses of these data.  
The paper now proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the Lavy (2015) study. 
Section 3 then discusses the PISA sample design, including the purpose and use of the different 
sets of available weights. Section 4 follows with a description of the PISA test, and what this 
implies for the pupil fixed-effects strategy employed by Lavy (2015). We then provide our 
recommendations for researchers who wish to apply fixed-effects within international 
achievement datasets such as PISA in section 5. Conclusions follow in section 6.  
2. The Lavy (2015) study 
We decided to replicate Lavy (2015), published in a leading economics journal (The Economic 
Journal), purely due to methodological considerations; we have little argument to make against 
the key substantive results. Rather, the work of Lavy (2015) serves as an interesting case study 
as the empirical analysis does not make any adjustment for many of the subtle technical aspects 
of the PISA data. For instance, the final student weights we discuss in section 3 have not been 
applied, while the implications of the complex test design have not been explored. Yet, as noted 
in the introduction, this empirical approach to the PISA data is increasingly being used in the 
literature – and has been applied by others working in this area (e.g. Rivkin and Schiman 2015; 
Hanushek, Piopiunik and Wiederhold 2014; and Cattaneo, Oggenfuss and Wolter 2017). 
                                                          
4 The syntax and data provided by The Economic Journal to replicate Lavy (2015) is publicly available in the 
“Supporting Information” section at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecoj.12233/abstract, which 
allows us to exactly reproduce Lavy’s (2015) published results. 
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Additionally, to the extent that the syntax and data used by Lavy (2015) are publicly available, 
this paper provides an opportunity to consider what the complex PISA sample and test design 
implies for applying different estimation strategies to the PISA data, and how an interesting set 
of empirical results are affected once these issues have been taken into account. 
Specifically, Lavy (2015) investigates whether spending more time learning a subject in school 
has a positive impact upon a pupil’s academic performance. Using PISA 2006 data, the author 
examines how the results compare between a set of developed, developing and Eastern 
European countries, with the aim of getting as close to a causal effect as possible.  
The paper begins by presenting results from a set of basic OLS regression models, comparing 
how hours spent learning a subject per week in school is related to PISA test scores. These 
models are of the form: 
 𝑃𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 +  𝛽. 𝑋𝑖𝑗 +  𝛾. 𝐻𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗         ∇ 𝑘 (1) 
Where: 
𝑃𝑖𝑗 = PISA scores of pupil 𝑖 within school 𝑗. 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 = Basic set of pupil’s demographic characteristics. 
𝐻𝑖𝑗 = Hours spent by pupil 𝑖 learning a subject in school 𝑗 per week.  
𝜀𝑖𝑗 = The error term, with a Huber-White adjustment made to the estimated standard errors to 
take the clustering of pupils within schools into account.  
𝑖 = Pupil 𝑖. 
𝑗 = School 𝑗. 
∇ 𝑘 = Indicating that separate models are estimated for each of the three PISA subjects. 
Then, in a second set of models, the main identification strategy is employed. Pupil fixed-
effects are added, removing all the between-pupil variation. This means that the data are set up 
so that there are three observations per pupil (one for each of the three PISA subjects: reading, 
mathematics and science). The pupil fixed-effects model includes a dummy variable for each 
pupil in the dataset, stripping away all the between-pupil information, and leaving only the 
within-pupil variation. The identification strategy relies on the assumption that 𝛽 and 𝛾 are not 
indexed by 𝑘 – see further discussion on this assumption in Lavy (2015, pp. F401-F402). The 
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focus of these models is therefore a pupil’s relative performance across the different PISA 
subject areas. In other words, these pupil fixed-effects models rely upon within-pupil variation 
only (e.g. how well a pupil performs in science relative to reading and mathematics) and how 
this relates to the time they spend learning science versus reading (and mathematics) in school. 
Specifically, they are of the form: 
 𝑃𝑖𝑘 = 𝛼 +  𝛾. 𝐻𝑖𝑘 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘 (2) 
Where: 
𝑃𝑖𝑘 = PISA scores of pupil 𝑖 within subject 𝑘. 
𝐻𝑖𝑘 = Hours spent by pupil 𝑖 learning subject 𝑘 in school per week. 
𝜇𝑖 = Pupil fixed-effects. 
𝜀𝑖𝑘 = Random error for pupil 𝑖 within subject 𝑘. A Huber-White adjustment is then made to the 
estimated standard errors to take the clustering of pupils within schools into account. 
Both the OLS and pupil fixed-effects models are estimated using large samples that have been 
pooled across several countries. This includes a sample of (a) 153,578 pupils from 22 OECD 
countries; (b) 59,005 pupils from 14 Eastern European countries and (c) 79,646 pupils from 13 
developing countries. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the key results. The estimations of the equation (2) model by 
OLS suggest there is a substantial impact of instruction time upon pupils’ PISA scores, with 
effect sizes ranging between approximately 0.2 (developed countries) and 0.4 standard 
deviations (developing and Eastern European countries) per additional study hour. However, 
these are vastly reduced once the pupil fixed-effects strategy has been employed, particularly 
in developing countries, where the impact of an additional hour is only just above zero (0.03 
standard deviations). This leads to a headline conclusion that although instruction time has a 
positive and statistically significant impact upon pupils’ PISA achievement, the effect is much 
lower in the developing world.  
<< Table 1 >> 
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3. The PISA sample design and the use of weights 
This section summarises information contained in PISA technical documents (OECD 2009a, 
2009b). PISA aims to draw a representative sample of in-school pupils in each country who 
are age 15 at the time of assessment. However, as with many school-based surveys, PISA is 
not a simple random sample from the population. Rather, a probabilistic, stratified and 
clustered sample design is used.5 One of the key features of this design is that in some countries 
schools and/or pupils are oversampled (this is often done to facilitate comparisons within these 
countries at the state/provincial level). These countries then have a much larger sample size; in 
Canada, Spain, Italy and Mexico more than 20,000 pupils participated in PISA 2012 (compared 
to an international median of around 5,000 pupils). In other countries, pupils with certain 
demographic characteristics may be oversampled. Australia is a prime example, where all 
Indigenous pupils within selected schools are asked to participate, so that reliable estimates of 
achievement can be produced for this important minority group.  
Consequently, the PISA dataset comes with two sets of weights. These are: 
a) Final student (or sampling) weights. These scale the sample up to the size of the 
population within each country. The contribution of each country to a cross-national 
analysis (e.g. a cross-country regression model) therefore depends upon its population 
size (i.e. bigger countries carry more weight). 
b) Senate weights. These weights sum up to the same constant value within each country.6 
Therefore, within a cross-country regression model, each country will contribute 
equally to the analysis (e.g. the results for Iceland will have the same impact upon 
estimates as results for the United States). 
One of these sets of weights should usually be applied when analyzing international educational 
achievement data, particularly when reporting descriptive statistics or running regression 
models with a limited number of controls (an exception is that, if all factors used to create the 
weights are included as covariates within the regression model, then the weights no longer need 
                                                          
5 We do not discuss here issues with regards the replication weights that are provided with the international 
achievement datasets, and how these should be used to calculate standard errors. Interested readers are directed to 
the working paper version of this publication, available from http://repec.ioe.ac.uk/REPEc/pdf/qsswp1704.pdf   
6 Senate weights are simply a re-scaling of the final student weights. They are constructed so that the sum of the 
weights for each country equals the same constant (typically chosen to be 1,000). 
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to be applied7). If the research question is about the population of pupils living within a specific 
group of countries (e.g. the population of pupils living within Eastern Europe) then the final 
sampling weights should be applied. Senate weights are, on the other hand, more appropriate 
when countries form the unit of analysis; if, for instance, one wants to know the average of a 
statistic across a set of countries (e.g. the mean PISA science score across the OECD). If 
weights are not applied, then pupils/schools with particular characteristics may be either under 
or over represented within the analysis. Indeed, it is only after applying these weights that point 
estimates (i.e. mean scores, regression coefficients) will be ‘correct,’ meaning that legitimate 
inferences can be made from the PISA sample about the population. 
One feature of Lavy (2015) is that no weights are applied in any part of the analysis (including 
the descriptive statistics). Therefore, by not applying these weights in his pooled cross-country 
regression models, the statistical contribution of each country to the analysis is essentially 
arbitrary. Rather than being based upon population size (as with the final student weights) or 
treating each country equally (as with senate weights) the contribution is based solely upon the 
size of the sample each country has decided to draw.  
Table 2 drives this point home by illustrating the relative importance of each country to the 
Lavy analysis if (a) no weights; (b) senate weights; and (c) final sampling weights are applied.8 
By not applying weights, too much importance has been given to some countries, while not 
enough has been given to others. Amongst developed countries, Canada serves as a good 
example. This is a country which drew a particularly large sample in 2006 – over 22,000 pupils 
– so that results could be reported separately by province. Consequently, Canada accounts for 
12 percent of Lavy’s developed country sample. However, when either student weights or 
senate weights are applied, the contribution of Canada falls to around five-six percent. Amongst 
developing countries, the figures for Mexico (another country that oversamples) are even more 
pronounced. Whereas this country drives around a third of Lavy’s developing country 
estimates, it should only account for around 14 percent based upon its population size. Finally, 
for Eastern Europe, the opposite holds true for Russia. Despite accounting for more than half 
                                                          
7 As Solon, Haider and Wooldridge (2015, p. 310) note, a: “practical example is where the survey organization 
provides sampling weights to adjust for differential nonresponse, including attrition from a panel survey, and 
these weights are based only on observable characteristics that are controlled for in the regression model 
(perhaps gender, race, age, location). In this situation, it is not clear that there is an advantage to using such 
weights”.  See also Cook and Gelman (2006). 
8 As Table 2 illustrates, when senate weights are applied, each country contributes equally to the analysis. 
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of Eastern Europe’s 15-year-old population, by not applying the sampling weights, Russia’s 
contribution to Lavy’s analysis is less than 10 percent. 
<< Table 2 >> 
What impact does this have upon the reported OLS regression coefficients?9 Table 3 
reproduces Lavy’s results once either the final sampling weights or senate weights have been 
applied. Depending upon the choice of weight, there are some non-trivial differences from the 
reported results. Comparing figures across the first two rows, the estimated effect of an 
additional hour of instruction within developed countries increases by almost 50 percent, up 
from 0.196 standard deviations when applying no weights to 0.276 standard deviations when 
applying the final sampling weights; moreover, the standard error has doubled (up to 0.014 
from 0.007). In contrast, the effect size has almost halved for Eastern Europe, declining from 
0.382 to 0.230 standard deviations. The developing country estimates have also fallen, but the 
change is less pronounced (fall from 0.366 to 0.325). When using senate weights, the effect 
size is similar to that of Lavy’s, but with larger standard errors. Together, Table 3 highlights 
how important changes to parameter estimates and their standard errors can occur depending 
upon whether weights are applied within cross-country regressions or not. 
<< Table 3 >> 
Is this just an issue in cross-country analyses? Or does the decision to apply weights or not also 
have an impact upon within single country estimates? In online Appendix B we illustrate how 
Lavy’s OLS regression estimates would change for three specific countries (Canada, Mexico 
and Russia) depending upon whether weights are applied. There are again some non-trivial 
differences, at least for Canada and Mexico, with the coefficient of interest (the impact of the 
number of hours studied) up to 26 percent lower once the final student weights have been 
applied. 
4. The PISA test design  
PISA is not a standard test; rather it has a complex psychometric design. A key feature is the 
use of ‘multiple matrix sampling’ (MMS), with the intuition behind this as follows: 
international assessments such as PISA attempt to measure pupils’ skills in a number of 
different subject areas (reading, mathematics, science, problem solving and financial literacy) 
                                                          
9 We focus upon the pooled OLS regression results here, as issues with the pupil fixed-effects strategy will be 
covered in section 4 below.  
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and within these a number of different sub-domains (e.g. ‘explaining phenomena 
scientifically’, ‘identifying scientific issues’ and ‘using scientific evidence’ in science). This 
results in a huge amount of test material to be covered, making it impossible to ask every pupil 
each test question. Consequently, in order to keep the length of the PISA test manageable (e.g. 
two hours), participants are randomly assigned to complete one particular test booklet, each of 
which includes only a limited number of test questions. 
Table 4 illustrates how this worked in practice in PISA 2006. In total, 108 science questions, 
31 reading questions and 48 mathematics questions were included in the assessment 
framework.10 These questions were then divided into seven science, four mathematics and two 
reading clusters (a cluster refers to a collection of test questions), each covering 30 minutes of 
test material. These clusters are labelled S1-S7, M1-M4 and R1-R2, respectively, in Table 4. 
Out of these clusters, a total of 13 test booklets were formed (labelled B1-B13). Note that some 
of these booklets included only science questions (e.g. booklets B1 and B5), while others 
included questions in only science and reading (e.g. booklet B6) or only science and 
mathematics (e.g. booklets B3, B4, B8 and B10). Within each participating school, pupils were 
randomly assigned to one of these 13 booklets. 
<< Table 4 >> 
Based upon pupils’ responses to the test questions, the survey organizers fit a complex item-
response theory (IRT) model to the data. This involves estimating a set of random-effects 
logistic regression models, where test questions are nested within participating students. Based 
upon this model, the difficulty of each test question is established and ‘test scores’ (or, more 
appropriately, proficiency estimates) for participants are produced. Describing the technical 
details behind this process is beyond the scope of this paper, though an overview is provided 
in online Appendix C, with interested readers directed to von Davier and Sinharay (2014, p. 
157 and p. 160 for further details). For a comprehensive overview of research on the 
measurement of student ability see Jacob and Rothstein (2016). 
The result of this process is the creation of the international PISA database. Within the 
international database, there appears to be five separate test scores for each individual in each 
subject area. To illustrate this point, an extract from this database is presented in online 
                                                          
10 One subject area is the focus in each cycle of PISA. In 2006, the focus was science, hence there were many 
more questions devoted to this subject than either reading or mathematics. 
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Appendix D, referring to a set of pupils who completed test booklet B1 in PISA 2006 – a 
booklet that contains four clusters of science. 
At this point, readers may be forgiven for suffering some confusion. Why are there five test 
scores per subject for each pupil rather than just one? And why do pupils who have not 
answered any reading or mathematics test questions seem to have a reading and mathematics 
test score (i.e. why do the pupils in Table 4 who all completed test booklet B1 – and therefore 
only answered science test questions – also have scores in reading and mathematics)? 
The intuition is as follows. As illustrated in Table 4, pupils answer only a limited number of 
questions from the total test item pool. Those questions they do not answer can be thought of 
as a form of ‘missing data’ (or item non-response). However, as pupils have been randomly 
assigned to test booklets, and thus to test questions, the missing data for the questions they have 
not been asked to answer can be considered to be Missing Completely At Random (MCAR). 
Consequently, multiple imputation is used to create test scores for each pupil in each subject 
area regardless of whether they have answered questions in that particular cognitive domain or 
not. 
The key take away message is therefore that the five PISA ‘test scores’ (known in the 
psychometric literature as ‘plausible values’) are essentially multiple imputations based upon 
(a) pupils’ answers to the subset of test questions they were randomly assigned (b) their 
responses to the background questionnaires and (c) school dummy variables. It is for this reason 
that the PISA database includes test scores (‘plausible values’) in, e.g. reading, even for pupils 
who did not actually answer any reading test questions. 
What are the implications of this for secondary analyses of the PISA data? 
How does one ‘correctly’ use these plausible values? The answer is that one should follow a 
version of ‘Rubin’s rules’ for handling multiple imputations (Rubin 1987). Further details are 
provided in OECD (2009a) and in online Appendix E. 
Rather than using all five plausible values as recommended by the survey organizers (see online 
Appendix E), Lavy only uses the first imputed value throughout his analysis. Does this make 
a difference to his results? The answer may be found in Table 5. The impact appears to be 
minimal, with only trivial changes to the estimated effect sizes and associated standard errors. 
Although it can be dangerous to draw strong conclusions from a single analysis, this result 
again reflects our experience more broadly of using international achievement databases (and 
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the PISA data in particular). Whether one uses just one plausible value, or follows 
recommended practice in using all five, has no impact upon the results.11 
However, the fact that PISA scores are essentially imputations does raise other concerns 
regarding how these data should and should not be used. This includes the application of some 
fairly standard econometric procedures, such as the use of fixed-effects. To see why, recall the 
PISA 2006 test design presented in Table 4, and how pupils are randomly allocated to one of 
these 13 booklets. Moreover some pupils, like those assigned booklet 1, answer science test 
questions only, and none in reading or mathematics. 
Now recall what a pupil fixed-effects methodology is trying to achieve. It strips away all the 
between-pupil differences, so that only within-pupil variation in achievement is left to explain. 
For example, in Lavy (2015), the pupil fixed-effects models essentially compare each pupil’s 
own performance in science relative to her performance in reading and mathematics, relating 
this to the relative amount of time she spends attending classes in each subject per week. 
However, as noted above, pupils’ ‘test scores’ (plausible values) are imputed, based upon how 
they answered a small number of test questions (sometimes just within a single subject area), 
the information they provided in the background questionnaire and school dummy variables.12 
In such a situation, the within-pupil variation in performance that exists across subjects is 
largely generated by the imputation procedure. Indeed, conceptually, it is not reliable to capture 
within-pupil variation in performance across different academic domains (e.g. relative 
performance in science compared to reading and mathematics) when some pupils have actually 
only answered questions in a single subject area (e.g. science). Moreover, because 𝐻𝑖𝑗 is 
included as one of the hundreds of regressors used to impute the outcome (the PISA plausible 
values) but is also the covariate of interest within the substantive model, endogeneity may 
potentially become a concern.  
Alternatively, one could argue that the use of pupil fixed-effects violates the often cited 
principle within the multiple imputation literature for how imputation models should be built. 
                                                          
11 Indeed, the survey organizers themselves recognize that the use of a single plausible value actually provides 
both unbiased point and sampling variance estimates, stating that ‘using one plausible value or five plausible 
values does not really make a substantial difference on large samples’ (OECD 2009b, p. 46). The only aspect that 
using a single plausible value misses is the ‘imputation error’ – uncertainty that should be added to the standard 
error to reflect that multiple imputation is used to generate the science, reading and mathematics proficiency 
scores. Yet, in practice, this additional imputation error is almost always of negligible magnitude (as per the Lavy 
example), with key conclusions continuing to hold if it is simply ignored. 
12 The information captured in the background questionnaires includes demographic data and pupils’ attitudes.  
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Namely that all variables included in the substantive model should also be included in the 
imputation model as well (see Carpenter and Kenward 2013). If this is not the case, the 
estimated effects in the substantive model could be biased. Of course, this principle then 
implies that individual fixed-effects should be included in the latent regression imputation 
model for PISA scores, as well as the substantive model linking hours of study to performance. 
However, this is not the case in the generation of the PISA plausible values, as such a model 
would be almost impossible to identify (with too little information available for each pupil).  
To try and formalize our argument, consider pupils who were randomly assigned to complete 
science booklets 1 or 5. As illustrated by Table 4, these pupils only answered science test 
questions, and so have had their mathematics and reading scores imputed based upon (a) how 
they performed on the science test questions, (b) available background information and (c) the 
correlation between science and reading (and/or mathematics) scores of the pupils who 
answered both reading (and/or mathematics) and science test questions. 
A simplified version of this process can be thought of as follows:  
 𝑅?̂? =  𝛼1 + 𝛽1. 𝑆𝑖 + 𝛾1. 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀1  (3) 
 𝑀?̂? =  𝛼2 + 𝛽2. 𝑆𝑖 + 𝛾2. 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀2  (4) 
Where: 
𝑅?̂? = Imputed reading test scores of pupil 𝑖. 
𝑀?̂? = Imputed mathematics test scores of pupil 𝑖. 
𝑆𝑖 = Performance of pupil 𝑖 on the PISA science questions 
𝑋𝑖 = A vector of background characteristics 
𝜀  = Imputation error. 
With a pupil fixed-effects model, we are interested in the within-pupil variation only; the 
difference between these pupils imputed reading and mathematics scores (constraining the 
problem to 𝑘 =  2 subjects for simplicity). Hence the difference, (3) – (4), becomes: 
 𝑅?̂? − 𝑀?̂? = (𝛼1 − 𝛼2) + (𝛽1 − 𝛽2). 𝑆𝑖 + (𝛾1 − 𝛾2). 𝑋𝑖 + (𝜀1 − 𝜀2)  (5) 
Particular challenges emerge in equation (5) when 𝛽1 ≈ 𝛽2 (i.e. the association between science 
and reading scores is reasonably similar to the association between science and mathematics 
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scores) and 𝛾1 ≈ 𝛾2 (i.e. the association between background factors and performance in 
reading and mathematics is similar). In such a situation, to the extent that 𝜀1 is only weakly 
correlated with 𝜀2, the final term of equation 5 (𝜀1 −  𝜀2) will dominate. Indeed, to the extent 
that 𝛽1 ≈ 𝛽2 and 𝛾1 ≈ 𝛾2 then (5) reduces to: 
 𝑅?̂? − 𝑀?̂? ≈ (𝜀1 −  𝜀2) (6) 
In other words, the difference between these pupils’ PISA reading and mathematics scores will 
simply be random noise. More generally, the signal-to-noise ratio in such a situation is likely 
to be extremely low, given the likely positive association between 𝛽1 and 𝛽2, and between 𝛾1 
and 𝛾2, while 𝜀1 is only weakly correlated with 𝜀21314. Indeed, this has been implicitly 
recognized by the psychometricians who have designed the tests, who have warned that 
‘reliable individual proficiency estimates cannot be obtained’ (Oranje and Ye 2014, p. 204), 
that they ‘are not intended to produce and disseminate individual results at the respondent or 
even the classroom or school level’ (von Davier and Sinharay 2014, p. 156) and that they ‘lack 
accuracy on the individual test-taker’ (von Davier and Sinharay 2014, p. 156). In other words, 
the error component (𝜀1 −  𝜀2) is so large that test scores for individual pupils are unreliable.  
Given the number of unknowns in equation (5), putting a sign or magnitude on the bias this 
may induce into one’s analysis is not possible. Hence whether applying fixed-effects to such 
data produces reliable and robust estimates becomes an empirical question – which should be 
tested on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, in the following section, we provide direction to 
researchers applying fixed-effects to such databases as to how they can check the robustness 
of their results.  
5. What should econometricians do if they want to apply individual fixed-effects 
using international assessment data?  
                                                          
13 In PISA, multivariate imputation procedures are used which allow there to be some correlation between the 
error terms across different subjects (i.e. 𝜀1 is to some extent allowed to be correlated with 𝜀2). For instance, in 
PISA 2006 data the weighted correlation (for all countries) between the first plausible value for reading and the 
first plausible value for maths (which are jointly drawn) is 0.785. Whereas the correlation between the first 
plausible value for reading and the second plausible value for maths (which are not jointly drawn) is slightly 
weaker, standing at 0.759. Nevertheless, the difference between these correlations is small, suggesting the 
correlation allowed between the errors is relatively weak.  
14 For example, assume that a single 𝑋 variable is used, and this is parental education. It is likely that there is a 
similar positive association between parental education and mathematics test scores and between parental 
education and reading scores. Hence 𝛾1 would be approximately equal to 𝛾2. 
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Although the previous section has outlined our concerns with the use of fixed-effects models 
applied to international databases, we also appreciate that robust yet pragmatic identification 
strategies are needed when using such resources to answer important and policy-relevant 
questions. In this section we therefore provide our advice to analysts who wish to use fixed-
effect approaches when analyzing such data.  
The intuition behind our recommendations is as follows. Section 4 set out the problem that 
some pupils do not answer any test questions in some subject areas, and hence have their scores 
imputed based largely upon how they performed in other domains. Thus, the difference 
between pupils’ scores in these two subjects is likely to mainly be due to the imputation noise 
(𝜀1 −  𝜀2).  
However, recall from Table 4 that some pupils do complete a reasonable amount of assessment 
material (approximately one hour of test questions) in two subject areas. For instance, those 
pupils who were randomly assigned to booklets 3, 4, 8 and 10 completed one hour of science 
test questions and one hour of mathematics questions. Hence for this sub-sample of pupils one 
should be less concerned that within-pupil variation in mathematics and science scores is being 
driven by random imputation error, and is actually likely to be due to genuine and observable 
differences in pupils’ abilities. Consequently, our advice is that some robustness tests should 
be applied using this sub-sample of pupils only, with alternative test scores created for only 
those subjects where pupils have actually answered test questions. 
We apply this suggestion to the analysis presented by Lavy. For pupils who have completed 
booklets 3, 4, 8 and 10 we have created new mathematics and science scores, calculated as 
simply the number of questions that they answered correctly (i.e. pupils are given one mark for 
each question they answered correctly, half mark for each question partially correct and zero 
when incorrectly answered; then, scores have been standardized by booklet, to compare with 
Lavy’s estimates).15  The fixed-effect model presented in equation (2) is then estimated using 
this sub-sample of pupils only, which capture the effect of the amount of time studying science 
versus mathematics upon pupils’ science and mathematics test scores (i.e. the subjects, 𝑘, now 
include science and mathematics only and not reading). This model is estimated separately for 
each of the four booklets, as they each contain different sets of mathematics and science 
                                                          
15 We note that more sophisticated methods could be used to create these scores, including IRT-based techniques. 
Summative scores have been used here for simplicity and transparency, which we believe to be important when 
explaining this general approach.  
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questions (testing different aspects of pupils’ mathematics and science ability), and the results 
compared. Results from this analysis are presented in Table 6. We consider results to be 
‘robust’ if the point estimates and substantive conclusions are consistent across each of the 
different rows in Table 6 (i.e. regardless of which test booklet is used). 
 << Table 6 >>  
The first two rows of Table 6 reproduce the results from Lavy (2015), with the estimates using 
only science and mathematics in the second row. For developed countries, the effect of hours 
on instruction on science and mathematics outcomes remains positive and statistically 
significant across the four booklets, with the magnitude of the effect ranging from 0.04 to 0.07 
standard deviations. These particular results are clearly rather robust, and largely unaffected by 
the peculiarities of the PISA test design.  
The results for Eastern European countries are somewhat different. The primary results of Lavy 
reported a positive and statistically significant effect of 0.06. However, this effect vanishes 
when the analysis is restricted  to only those pupils who took science and mathematics test 
questions, and even turns negative and significant (-0.04) for pupils assigned to booklet 10. In 
this sense, we believe that simply relying upon the plausible values provided in the international 
database may lead one to reach the wrong conclusion – a small positive effect may be identified 
when one does not really exist.  
The results for developing countries fall between these two extremes. There is a non-trivial 
difference in the point estimates when performing the estimates across the test booklets, though 
they all tend to be positive and small in terms of magnitude. However, we also believe that the 
additional robustness tests we have conducted in Table 6 bring into question one of the headline 
findings in Lavy’s (2015) abstract, that the effect of instructional time is: “much lower in 
developing countries”. 
Taken together, Table 6 suggests that some results can change depending upon whether one 
uses the plausible values when implementing the pupil fixed-effects models, or when restricting 
the sample to only those pupils who have taken an adequate number of test questions within a 
given subject area. However, these changes seem to be relatively modest in terms of absolute 
magnitude. Our key conclusion is therefore that a pupil fixed-effects approach using 
international achievement databases such as PISA does seem to be a valid identification 
strategy, though one which should be subject to a series of additional robustness tests as we 
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have suggested, given the peculiar nature of the test design. This, we believe, is an important 
finding, and one which potentially opens up new opportunities to those analyzing these 
databases.  
6. Conclusions 
International studies of educational achievement are becoming increasingly high-profile 
resources, with secondary analyses of these data having the potential to influence education 
policy and practice across the world. Yet the complex survey and test designs used remain 
misunderstood by many consumers of these data. This not only includes politicians, 
policymakers and the general public who digest the results, but also the academics who analyze 
the data to produce secondary research. Resources such as PISA are consequently often being 
analyzed in a manner not intended by the survey organizers. The aim of this paper has therefore 
been to foster a better understanding of the complex features of international large-scale 
assessments, particularly amongst economists, who now frequently use these resources in their 
work. 
Using Lavy (2015) as a case study, we have provided an overview of the survey methodology 
underpinning studies such as PISA, highlighting the impact of applying the survey weights 
when conducting cross-country analyses using pooled international samples. Likewise, several 
unusual features of the PISA test design have been explored, including the use of multiple 
matrix sampling and the resulting imputations of pupils’ proficiency scores (‘plausible 
values’). In doing so, we have argued how some fairly standard econometric approaches should 
only be applied to these data with caution, and require an additional set of important robustness 
tests. More generally, a key lesson from this paper is that the statistical techniques required to 
robustly analyze resources such as PISA are perhaps more complicated than first meets the eye.  
What do these findings then imply for the users, producers and consumers of these data? We 
offer two suggestions. First, more clarity and greater transparency are needed from the survey 
organizers about the test design, and exactly how the proficiency values (i.e. the ‘PISA scores’) 
are produced. Indeed, the imputation models used to generate the so-called plausible values 
remain a black-box. Although some of the relevant details are available in the depths of the 
technical reports, we believe a more open, transparent and widespread discussion of the 
methodologies underpinning these studies would be hugely beneficial. This, we believe, is key 
to getting a broader cross-section of researchers to understand what these data can and cannot 
reveal, and how much faith should be placed upon the results. Our suggestion is that providing 
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the code to reproduce the imputation models, allowing independent researchers to see how the 
plausible values are derived from the underlying data, represents a first critical step in this 
direction.  
Second, at the same time, it is also the responsibility of users of these resources to develop a 
better understanding of the properties of the data. Indeed, when evaluating the appropriateness 
of empirical strategies using these data, economists should be aware of how the imputation 
process is conducted, including the variables that are employed in the underlying imputation 
model.  Various technical reports and user guides now exist, which include many of the key 
details (e.g. OECD 2009b). Applied researchers should also take more advantage of the many 
excellent software plugins for analyzing these datasets now available for standard statistical 
packages such as R and Stata (Avvisati and Keslair 2014; Caro 2016), which greatly reduce 
the computational burden. Moreover, despite the limitations and complications we have 
highlighted with these data, we continue to believe they are a useful and valuable source of 
secondary data. 
In highlighting these points, we hope to have improved the transparency of the methodology 
behind international large-scale education achievement surveys, highlighted the care that needs 
to be taken when analyzing these data and the caveats that are required when interpreting the 
results. Although we continue to see the value in international studies of educational 
achievement such as PISA, and their potential to influence education policy for the better, we 
also feel that far more scrutiny needs to be given to the unusual features of their design. This, 
we believe, will help people to better understand what can and cannot be done with the data, 
and place more nuanced interpretations upon the PISA results.  
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Table 1. An overview of key results from Lavy (2015) 
  OECD Developing  Eastern Europe 
  Effect size SE Effect size SE Effect size SE 
OLS 0.196*** 0.007 0.366*** 0.012 0.382*** 0.013 
FE 0.058*** 0.004 0.030*** 0.008 0.061*** 0.006 
Observations 460,734 238,938 177,015 
Notes: Results refer to the estimated impact of a one hour increase in 
instructional time upon pupils’ PISA test scores, reported as an effect size. 
Coefficient: ***Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Source: Lavy (2015 Table 3 and Table 8). 
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Table 2. The role of weights in determining countries’ importance in pooled cross-
country analyses  
(a) Developed countries 
  No weight Senate weight Student weight 
Canada 12% 5% 6% 
Italy 12% 5% 9% 
Spain 11% 5% 6% 
Australia 8% 5% 4% 
UK 7% 5% 12% 
Switzerland 7% 5% 1% 
Belgium 5% 5% 2% 
Japan 3% 5% 18% 
Portugal 3% 5% 1% 
Austria 3% 5% 1% 
Germany 3% 5% 15% 
Greece 3% 5% 2% 
Netherlands 3% 5% 3% 
New Zealand 3% 5% 1% 
Finland 3% 5% 1% 
France 3% 5% 12% 
Norway 3% 5% 1% 
Ireland 2% 5% 1% 
Luxembourg 2% 5% 0% 
Denmark 2% 5% 1% 
Sweden 2% 5% 2% 
Iceland 2% 5% 0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Lavy (2015: Table A1) and authors’ own calculations from PISA (2006). 
(b) Developing countries 
  No weight Senate weight Student weight 
Mexico 30% 8% 14% 
Indonesia 10% 8% 27% 
Brazil 9% 8% 22% 
Jordan 6% 8% 1% 
Thailand 6% 8% 8% 
Kyrgyzstan 6% 8% 1% 
Chile 5% 8% 3% 
Azerbaijan 5% 8% 1% 
Turkey 5% 8% 8% 
Uruguay 5% 8% 0% 
Tunisia 5% 8% 2% 
Columbia 4% 8% 6% 
Argentina 4% 8% 6% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Lavy (2015: Table A3) and authors’ own calculations from PISA 
(2006). 
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(c) Eastern European countries 
  No weight Senate weight Student weight 
Slovenia 9% 7% 1% 
Czech Republic 8% 7% 4% 
Russian Federation 8% 7% 57% 
Poland 8% 7% 16% 
Croatia 7% 7% 1% 
Romania 7% 7% 7% 
Estonia 7% 7% 1% 
Serbia 7% 7% 2% 
Lithuania 7% 7% 2% 
Slovak Republic 7% 7% 2% 
Latvia 7% 7% 1% 
Bulgaria 6% 7% 2% 
Hungary 6% 7% 3% 
Montenegro 6% 7% 0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Lavy (2015: Table A2) and authors’ own calculations from PISA 
(2006). 
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Table 3. Changes to Lavy’s OLS estimates when the PISA weights are applied  
  Developed Developing  Eastern Europe 
  Effect size SE Effect size SE Effect size SE 
Lavy (2015) 0.196*** 0.007 0.366*** 0.012 0.382*** 0.013 
+final student weights 
0.276*** 
(+41%) 
0.014 
0.325***  
(-11%) 
0.019 
0.230***  
(-40%) 
0.014 
+senate weights 
0.188***  
(-4%) 
0.010 
0.340***  
(-7%) 
0.018 
0.362***  
(-5%) 
0.015 
Observations 460,734 238,938 177,015 
Notes: ‘Final student weights’ equivalent to weighting by the population size of the 
country, while ‘senate weights’ give equal weights to all countries, regardless of size. 
Coefficient: ***Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Source: Lavy (2015 Table 3 and Table 8) and authors’ own calculations. 
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Table 4. The PISA 2006 test design 
Booklet Clusters 
B1 S1 S2 S4 S7 
B2 S2 S3 M3 R1 
B3 S3 S4 M4 M1 
B4 S4 M3 S5 M2 
B5 S5 S6 S7 S3 
B6 S6 R2 R1 S4 
B7 S7 R1 M2 M4 
B8 M1 M2 S2 S6 
B9 M2 S1 S3 R2 
B10 M3 M4 S6 S1 
B11 M4 S5 R2 S2 
B12 R1 M1 S1 S5 
B13 R2 S7 M1 M3 
Notes: S1 to S7 refers to the seven science clusters 
(white shading), M1 to M4 the four mathematics 
clusters (light grey shading) and R1 to R2 the two 
reading clusters (dark grey shading). 
Source: OECD (2009a, p. 29) PISA 2006 technical 
report. 
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Table 5. Changes to OLS estimates depending upon how the plausible values are used 
  Developed Developing  Eastern Europe 
  
Effect 
size SE 
Effect 
size SE 
Effect 
size SE 
First plausible value only 0.276*** 0.011 0.325*** 0.016 0.230*** 0.016 
All five plausible values 0.277*** 0.012 0.327*** 0.017 0.230*** 0.016 
Observations 460,734 238,938 177,015 
Notes: Top row refers to the results after applying the final PISA response weights and 
Balanced-Repeated-Replication (BRR) weights, though only using the first plausible 
value. The bottom row provides the analogous estimates after following recommended 
practise in using all five plausible values (see online Appendix E).  
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
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Table 6. Alternative estimates of the pupil fixed-effects model using information from 
booklets 3, 4, 8 and 10 only 
 Developed Developing Eastern Europe 
 N Effect SE N Effect SE N Effect SE 
Lavy estimates (a) 460,734 0.058*** 0.004 238,938 0.030*** 0.008 177,015 0.061*** 0.006 
Lavy estimates (b) 307,156 0.071*** 0.006 159,292 0.032** 0.014 118,010 0.011 0.008 
Booklet 3 23,554 0.073*** 0.013 12,210 0.043* 0.026 9,122 -0.023 0.018 
Booklet 4 23,558 0.039*** 0.011 12,332 0.004 0.019 9,098 0.001 0.017 
Booklet 8 23,614 0.047*** 0.011 12,210 0.076*** 0.021 9,128 0.007 0.016 
Booklet 10 23,676 0.045*** 0.012 12,216 0.032  0.024 9,014 -0.035** 0.017 
Notes: Lavy estimates (a) stands for Lavy estimations using three subjects: reading, 
mathematics and science. Lavy estimates (b) stands for Lavy estimations using two subjects: 
mathematics and science. 
Coefficient: ***Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Source: Lavy (2015: Table 3 and Table 8) and authors’ own calculations. 
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Online Appendix A. A review of studies using PISA data in five economics journals 
 
Author(s) Year Journal Weights? 
Replicate 
weights? 
Plausible 
values? 
Chevalier, Gibbons, Thorpe, Snell and Hoskins 2009 EER No No+ Mentioned* 
Corak and Lauzon 2009 EER Yes Yes No 
Martins and Veiga 2010 EER Yes Yes Yes 
Nonoyama-Tarumi and Willms 2010 EER Yes Yes Yes 
Tramonte and Willms 2010 EER Yes Yes Yes 
Jensen and Rasmussen 2011 EER No No+ Mentioned* 
Meunier 2011 EER Yes Yes No 
Song 2011 EER No No+ No 
Woessmann 2011 EER Yes No+ No 
Filippin and Paccagnella 2012 EER Yes Yes No 
Gamboa and Waltenberg 2012 EER Yes No No 
Jürges, Schneider, Senkbeil and Carstensen 2012 EER Yes No+ No 
Micklewright, Schnepf and Silva 2012 EER No No+ Mentioned* 
Schneeweis and Zweimüller 2012 EER Yes No+ No 
Brunello and Rocco 2013 EER Yes No+ No 
Deutsch, Dumas and Silber 2013 EER Yes No No 
Hanushek 2013 EER No No No 
Lounkaew 2013 EER No No+ No 
Ryan 2013 EER Yes Yes Yes 
Herrero, Mendez and Villar 2014 EER No No Mentioned* 
Piopiunik 2014 EER Yes No+ No 
Polidano and Tabasso 2014 EER No No Mentioned* 
Mendez 2015 EER Yes Yes Yes 
Vardardottir 2015 EER Yes No+ Mentioned* 
Giannelli and Rapallini 2016 EER Yes No+ Yes 
Ruhose and Schwerdt 2016 EER Yes No+ No 
Hanushek and Wößmann 2006 Econ. J. No No+ No 
West and Woessmann 2010 Econ. J. Yes No+ No 
Ohinata and Ours 2013 Econ. J. No No+ Mentioned* 
Brunello et al 2015 Econ. J. No No+ No 
Rivkin and Schiman 2015 Econ. J. No No+ Mentioned* 
Wößmann 2005 Ed. Ec. Yes No+ No 
Ammermueller 2007 Ed. Ec. Yes No+ Yes 
Rangvid 2007 Ed. Ec. No No+ No 
Van Ours 2008 Ed. Ec. No No+ Mentioned* 
Sprietsma 2010 Ed. Ec. Yes No+ Yes 
Bratti, Checchi and Filippin 2011 Ed. Ec. Yes No+ Yes 
Dardanoni, Modica and Pennisi 2011 Ed. Ec. Yes No+ No 
Perelman and Santin 2011 Ed. Ec. No No No 
Agasisti 2013 Ed. Ec. Yes Yes Mentioned* 
Kiss 2013 Ed. Ec. Yes No No 
Patrinos 2013 Ed. Ec. No No No 
Polidano, Hanel and Buddelmeyer 2013 Ed. Ec. Yes No No 
Shafiq 2013 Ed. Ec. Yes Yes Yes 
Belot and Vandenberghe 2014 Ed. Ec. Yes No No 
Hof 2014 Ed. Ec. No No No 
Mahuteau and Mavromaras 2014 Ed. Ec. Yes Yes Yes 
Murat and Frederic 2015 Ed. Ec. Yes Yes Yes 
Oppedisano and Turati 2015 Ed. Ec. No No No 
Pritchett and Viarengo 2015 Ed. Ec. No No No 
Gramațki 2016 Ed. Ec. Yes No+ Yes 
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Jakubowski, Patrinos, Porta and Wiśniewski 2016 Ed. Ec. Yes Yes Yes 
Ost, Gangopadhyaya and Schiman 2016 Ed. Ec. No No No 
Yang 2016 Ed. Ec. Yes No+ No 
Ammermueller 2007 Em. Ec. Yes No+ Mentioned* 
Fuchs and Wößmann 2007 Em. Ec. Yes No+ No 
Rangvid 2007 Em. Ec. Yes No+ No 
Schneeweis and Winter-Ebmer 2007 Em. Ec. Yes No+ Mentioned* 
Mueller and Wolter 2014 Em. Ec. No No No 
Jakubowski 2015 Em. Ec. No No No 
Foley, Gallipoli and Green 2014 JHR Yes No+ No 
Notes: All articles using international educational assessment PISA data published in five 
economics journals since 2005: Economics of Education Review (EER), The Economic Journal 
(Econ. J.), Education Economics (Ed. Ec.), Empirical Economics (Em. Ec.) and The Journal 
of Human Resources (JHR). 
*= Mentioned plausible value methodology, but did not average across the five.  
+ = A Huber-White Adjustment/clustering was made to the standard errors. 
EER search based upon http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/02727757?sdc=1 
Econ. J. search based upon http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1468-0297 
Ed. Ec. search based upon http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/CEDE20/current 
Em. Ec. search based upon http://link.springer.com/journal/181 
JHR search based upon http://jhr.uwpress.org/search 
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Online Appendix B. Changes to Lavy’s OLS estimates if weights are applied 
  Canada Mexico  Russian Federation 
  Effect size SE Effect size SE Effect size SE 
Lavy (2015) 0.172*** 0.023 0.432*** 0.022 0.198*** 0.033 
+ final student weights 0.127*** 
(-26%) 
0.026 
0.377*** 
(-13%) 
0.042 
0.193*** 
(-3%) 
0.032 
Observations 55,281 70,836 15,051 
Notes: Top row refers to the results obtained following Lavy (2015) procedures, where 
no weights are applied, a Huber-White adjustment has been made to the estimated 
standard errors and only the first plausible value is used. Results in the second row 
replicate the Lavy procedures, but now applying the final student weights. 
Coefficient: ***Significant at 1% significance level, ** significant at 5%, significance 
level * significant at 10% significance level. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
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Online Appendix C. An overview of how PISA scores (‘plausible values’) are generated 
This appendix provides a simplified overview of the process used to generate the PISA 
plausible values. Readers interested in further technical details are directed to Rutkowski, von 
Davier and Rutkowski (2014) and the PISA technical reports (e.g. OECD 2009a) for further 
discussion.  
In order to describe the process used, we have broken it down into the following four steps: 
Step 1. Estimation of the international item parameters. In this first stage, a data file that pools 
together information from multiple countries is used. An Item-Response Theory (IRT) model 
is estimated using these pooled data to estimate the “item-difficulty” parameter for each 
question (one can think of this as the IRT equivalent of a percentage correct statistic for each 
question).16 This model only incorporates information from pupils who have actually answered 
the test question to estimate the item-parameters, and occurs before the imputation step. These 
item international IRT parameters are estimated and considered fixed at this point. 
Step 2. A giant principal components analysis (PCA) is conducted upon all the variables 
included in the background questionnaires. In reference to our empirical study of interest, the 
information pupils report on instruction time in each subject (𝐻𝑖𝑗, following the notation in the 
main text) is included within this PCA. The PCA is then estimated separately for each country, 
with the number of components retained set so that they jointly explain around 80 to 95 percent 
of the variation in all the background characteristics.17 
Step 3. A “latent regression” model is estimated, separately for each country, using (a) pupils’ 
responses to the test questions that they answered; (b) the international IRT parameters 
estimated in step 1; (c) the retained principal components derived in step 2 and (d) school 
dummy variables. This results in a distribution of possible PISA scores for each pupil in each 
subject (regardless of whether they have actually answered questions in that subject or not). 
For those pupils who have not answered a question in a given subject, this distribution is based 
upon (i) how they responded to the test questions in the other subject areas (ii) the responses 
they gave to the background questionnaire and (iii) school dummy variables.   
Step 4. Five or ten ‘plausible values’ are drawn from this distribution for each PISA domain.18 
These random values are jointly drawn so to maintain the covariance structure between the 
scores in the different subject areas. These are the final PISA scale scores.  
 
                                                          
16 In PISA 2000 to 2012, a Rasch model was used, and hence only the item-difficulty parameter was estimated 
from the IRT model (with the discrimination parameter constrained to 1). This changed in PISA 2015, when item-
discrimination was only estimated for some items.  
17 The percentage of variance explained by the components has changed between cycles. Although it was 95 
percent in 2006, it is a smaller proportion (80 percent) in 2015.  
18 In PISA 2000 to 2012 five plausible values were drawn. In 2015, this increased to 10.  
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Online Appendix D. An extract illustrating the ‘plausible values’ within the PISA database 
   Reading Mathematics Science 
Country School id Student id PV1 PV2 PV3 PV4 PV5 PV1 PV2 PV3 PV4 PV5 PV1 PV2 PV3 PV4 PV5 
Argentina 1 10 410 329 394 348 371 349 309 359 394 389 330 279 326 310 362 
Australia 1 4 444 448 439 490 448 454 477 460 489 513 483 473 472 456 526 
Austria 1 26 604 668 664 664 669 623 729 697 697 655 647 705 692 692 699 
Azerbaijan 1 2 455 520 370 445 436 535 540 526 514 521 509 541 491 514 486 
Belgium 1 13 427 380 386 363 351 448 366 456 458 451 434 379 416 434 420 
Bulgaria 2 5 572 572 484 460 484 408 408 403 491 403 433 433 374 417 374 
Brazil 2 12 386 372 325 342 299 324 337 358 357 341 370 379 377 333 352 
Canada 1 5 492 478 469 535 551 489 486 520 506 573 473 477 485 484 499 
Switzerland 1 6 442 501 469 408 448 478 439 453 432 475 471 508 473 456 515 
Chile 1 3 591 613 498 613 478 454 475 457 475 434 554 553 533 553 548 
Notes: Extract from the PISA (2006) database, referring to a set of pupils who completed test booklet B1. ‘PV’ stands for plausible value. 
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Online Appendix E. Rubin’s rules for handling multiple imputations (and plausible 
values) 
The correct procedure for handling the plausible values provided in the international 
achievement databases can be divided into four steps, based upon the original work of Rubin 
(1987) for handling multiple imputations: 
Step 1: Estimate the statistic/model of interest five times, once using each of the plausible 
values. This will generate five separate parameter estimates (𝛽𝑝𝑣) and five estimates of the 
sampling error (𝜎𝑝𝑣).
19 
Step 2: To produce the final parameter and sampling error estimates, one simply takes the 
average of the five estimates produced in step 1: 
𝛽∗ =
∑ 𝛽𝑝𝑣
5
𝑝𝑣=1
𝑛𝑝𝑣
 
𝜎∗ =
∑ 𝜎𝑝𝑣
5
𝑝𝑣=1
𝑛𝑝𝑣
 
Where: 𝛽∗= Final estimate of the statistic / parameter of interest 
𝜎∗ = Final estimate of the sampling error 
𝑛𝑝𝑣 = The number of plausible values (typically five) 
Step 3: Estimate the magnitude of the imputation error, based upon the following formula: 
𝛿∗ =  
∑ (𝛽𝑝𝑣 − 𝛽∗)
25
𝑝𝑣=1
𝑛𝑝𝑣 − 1
 
Where:  
𝛿∗ = The magnitude of the imputation error. 
Step 4: Calculate the value of the final standard error by combining the sampling error (𝜎∗) and 
the imputation error (𝛿∗) via the following formula: 
Standard error = √𝜎∗2 + (1 +
1
𝑃𝑉
) . 𝛿∗2 
                                                          
19 Note that the BRR weights described in the previous section should also be applied each of the five times the 
model is estimated.  
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One can then use the final parameter estimate (𝛽∗) and its standard error to conduct hypothesis 
tests and construct confidence intervals following the usual methods. 
